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Introduction 
 
The Arab World belongs to the group of countries in which the demographic transition is in 
full swing, as both fertility and mortality have declined considerably over the last few 
decades. At first glance, the Arab World is experiencing the same kind of demographic 
processes Europe went through in the past, only later and faster. However, a closer 
investigation of the key variables involved in the transition uncovers some important 
differences in the mechanisms behind fertility decline. Whereas in Europe the fertility decline 
(during the first demographic transition) was the result of birth control within marriage, in the 
Arab world fertility decline is also driven by rising ages at marriage that in turn shortens the 
reproductive career of women (Rashad 2000; Rashad & Khadr 2002; Fargues 2005). 
In Western Europe, the fertility decline went hand in hand with a mimetic desire for 
marriage, which manifested itself into lower ages at marriage and a declining number of 
permanent singles (Matthijs 2002). Today, in the Arab world, the opposite is the case, as ages 
at marriage have risen in such a way that scholars are talking about a marriage revolution 
(Rashad 2000). However, inclining ages at marriage in the Arab countries are not the result of 
a diminished desire for marriage (Engelen & Puschmann 2011a). Marriage continues to be 
one of the main goals in the life of young people in the Arab world, which is illustrated by the 
fact that marriage has stayed more or less universal in most Arab countries. 
In this chapter we will focus on the dual role of nuptiality change. On the one hand, it 
creates all kind of new opportunities for people living in the region, on the other, it gives rise 
to new challenges. As marriage postponement accelerates fertility decline, population growth 
slows down faster. For many reasons, this is likely to lead to different outcomes. First, it 
creates a demographic momentum, which can boost the economy temporarily through the 
presence of a large and cheap labor force (Bloom, Canning & Sevilla 2001). Second, the fact 
that parents rear less children, will lead to more human capital, as parents can spend more 
time and money on each individual child (Becker 1960). Higher investments in human capital 
do increase per-capita income and consumption, opening up possibilities for growth (Lee & 
Mason 2010). Third, fertility decline is likely to result in wealth concentration, as family 
capital is divided among a smaller number of inheritors. Fourth, as population growth 
decelerates, a smaller share of public expenditures will be used to give new people access to 
existing public services, like education, health care, infrastructure and transportation. This 
makes it possible to improve the quality of these services and to alleviate poverty more 
efficiently (Kent & Haub 2005). 
Simultaneously, the damaging effects of population growth to the environment will 
decrease. The region has been suffering in the previous decades from food shortages and a 
decline in water-availability per capita, leading to water-scarcity and desertification (Al-
Weshah 2002). This has led to political tensions and conflicts, and has been a driving force 
behind massive rural-to-urban migration and high-speed urbanization, with all its negative 
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consequences including high unemployment rates, growing inequality, social unrest, and the 
rise of shantytowns (Knerr 2004; Nedoroscik 1997; Puschmann 2011). Decelerated 
population growth will help governments and urban planners tackle these challenges. Last but 
not least, postponement of marriage and fertility decline can be beneficial for women. The 
fact that ages at marriage have risen faster among females than among males, has reduced the 
age gap between husbands and wives. This trend is likely to increase the bargaining power of 
married women. Moreover, because married life starts later and women dedicate less of their 
life-time to reproduction, women’s possibilities of performing paid labor and activities 
outside the household are growing (Engelen & Puschmann 2011a).  
Nuptiality and fertility decline also create new challenges. As a result of high-speed 
fertility decline, the population of the Arab world is ageing at an increasingly faster pace. As a 
result, a growing number of people will have to rely on care from shrinking proportions of 
working-age people. It will be necessary to take measures, otherwise the pension system will 
break down, the health care system will fail, and long-term economic development will be 
undermined. Without governmental intervention the burden of an ageing population will be 
passed on to the family. Accordingly, elderly who have no relatives will especially suffer, as 
they will not be able to count on care and assistance from family members. Ageing might 
have especially severe consequences for women because it is likely that they will have to act 
as prime caretakers for the elderly in their family. This would mean that the burden of feeding 
and rearing a great number of children will be replaced by the care for an even larger number 
of older relatives. 
Nuptiality change also creates tensions within families, especially because young 
people in the Arab world still prefer to marry (young), but can do so only at more advanced 
ages (Bakass & Ferrand 2013). Since marriage is postponed, young men and women keep on 
living, for an extended period of time, with their parents and remain under their authority. 
This is not self-evident for several reasons. First, the children are better educated than their 
parents, but still have to obey them at an advanced age. Second, parents continue to control 
the sexuality of their unmarried daughters, as pre-marital sex is still taboo (especially for 
women) and might lead to family shame (Saadawi 2007). This limits the day-to-day life of 
unmarried females. Third, a main transfer of wealth between parents and children is delayed, 
because children are expected to contribute to the budget of the family of orientation, limiting 
their own opportunities to save for their future family (Booth 2007).  
These frustrations within the household seem to have started to merge with 
dissatisfaction about the political situation, culminating in the so-called Arab Spring. Contrary 
to scholars trying to explain the late revolutions in the Arab countries mainly in terms of a 
youth bulge (Cincotta 2012; Cincotta this volume), we argue that the Arab spring is closely 
related to the marriage revolution. The youngest generation in the Arab world has invested 
more time and money in education, which has heightened their expectations about their 
future. However, their opportunities in life have not increased accordingly. Conversely, they 
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face relative deprivation: compared to the less-educated generation of parents and 
grandparents, young people today have a harder time reaching their goals in life, including 
marriage and family formation. These young unmarried people, who lack the privileges 
related to married life – sexual intercourse, independence, authority, social status – make the 
government responsible for their situation, as it has failed to provide them with acceptable 
economic opportunities. At the same time, the fact that they are unmarried makes them more 
willing to participate in revolts against undemocratic and corrupt regimes (Marks 2011a; 
2011b).  
This chapter starts with an introduction to demographic transition theory. In this 
section, the key concepts related to the first and second demographic transition are reviewed, 
and some critics are discussed. Next, we describe the core processes of the first demographic 
transition in the Arab World. Subsequently, we will have a look at the characteristics and the 
causes of marriage change, as the Arab ‘marriage revolution’ greatly influences fertility 
decline (Rashad & Khadr 2002). Next to persistent below-replacement fertility, rising ages at 
first marriage, increasing divorce rates, growing rates of cohabitation, and increasing numbers 
of births out of wedlock, are main characteristics of the second demographic transition (Van 
de Kaa 2002; Lesthaeghe 2010). We will evaluate if marriage change in the Arab World 
actually can be put under the header of such a concept. Subsequently, we will deal with the 
consequences of marriage change. First, we will have a look at the (potential) positive effects 
of declining population growth rates, i.e. a restoration of the balance between population size 
and resources, and women’s empowerment. Second, we consider side-effects such as ageing 
and rising tensions within families and society at large. Finally, we will show that marriage 
change is one of the drivers of the Arab Spring.  
Before we start our inquiry, it is important to define the region under study and to 
describe it from a geo-political perspective. We define the Arab world as the countries which 
are member states of the Arab League, apart from Comoros because of its specific geographic 
location (in the Indian Ocean, north of Madagascar). Thereby, we include the following 
twenty-one countries: Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya,  Egypt, Sudan, Syria, 
Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, Bahrain, United Arab 
Emirates, Oman, Yemen, Djibouti and Somalia. These countries can be grouped into four 
main regions: The Maghreb, the Mashreq, the Gulf and the peripheral countries in the south  
In all above-mentioned countries, Arabic is an official language and Islam is the most 
practiced religion. At first sight the Arab world is relatively homogeneous. This is only 
partially true as this area is home to several ethnic and religious minorities, like Shiites, 
Christian Copts, Jews, Blacks, Berbers, Kurds, etc. Economically speaking, the region is 
diverse, as it contains some of the richest (Qatar and United Arab Emirates) and some of the 
poorest countries (Djibouti, Yemen, Mauritania, Sudan and Somalia) in the world. These 
differences in development among neighboring Arab countries are to a large degree 
explainable on the basis of the availability of oil reserves, internal political (in)stability, 
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involvement in the Arab-Israel conflict, the degree to which macro-economic reforms (mainly 
economic liberalization) have been implemented, and differences in fertility (Winckler 2005: 
1-5). Within the Arab countries, differences in living standards among the poor and rich are 
huge, as in most states social security systems are absent or defect, and only a small minority 
of the population takes advantages of the country’s natural resources.  
 
 
 
 
1 Demographic transition theory 
 
The first demographic transition 
The concept of the demographic transition is usually credited to the American demographer 
Frank Notestein. In his 1945 article Population: the long view, he formulated a three-stage 
model of population change, which has become one of the most fruitful generalizations in the 
field of social sciences  (Kirk 1996). According to that three-stage model (graph 1), every 
country in the world, sooner or later, experiences a shift from high to low death and birth 
rates. The initiation of the demographic transition is a clear break from the past, as mortality 
decline starts without any structural change in fertility, opening up the way to high population 
growth. Like existed before the transition, many babies are born, but now many of them reach 
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maturity, leading to a constant rise in life expectancy. In a second phase, fertility starts to 
decline and as a result population gradually begins to slow down. In the third and final stage, 
a new equilibrium established as both birth and death rates settle at the same low level. 
Population growth is slow again, but  a young population has been replaced by an older, 
ageing population.  
Today, the world can be divided roughly into countries which have completed the first 
demographic transition (e.g. Europe and North America), countries in which the shift is in full 
swing (e.g. North Africa and the Middle East) and countries which only more recently 
experienced some decline in mortality and fertility (most notably Sub-Saharan Africa). The 
Western countries were the first to experience the transition and the first to complete it. In 
Europe a structural decline in mortality started around the middle of the eighteenth century, 
thanks to better hygiene and improved infrastructure. During the nineteenth century, mortality 
continued to decline due to the introduction of vaccination programs, improved food 
production, the reorganization of urban areas (e.g. construction of water pipes and sewers) 
and the improvement of working and living conditions (Livi-Bacci 2012). During the 
twentieth century mortality rates further declined and life-expectancy rose higher and higher, 
but the rate of change became slower. 
From about the middle of the nineteenth century on, mortality decline was followed by 
fertility decline. Married couples in the Western world started to reduce the number of births 
within marriage by way of withdrawal and rhythm (Lesthaeghe 2010). Fertility decline was 
largely a  result of parent’s reaction to the fact that less children died premature (Lee 2003). 
Simultaneously, economic motivations also drove this shift in reproductive behavior. In the 
course of the nineteenth century it became financially more attractive to have less children, as 
they started to contribute less to the family budget (e.g. prohibition of child labor), while their 
education became more expensive, mainly as a result of the introduction of compulsory 
school attendance (Caldwell 1976, 1981; Kirk 1996). While economic change seems to have 
fostered a motivation to reduce fertility, religion and culture acted as a barrier, temporarily 
preventing some people in some regions to reduce fertility at a time when this had become 
economically rewarding (Lesthaeghe & Wilson 1986; Engelen 1998). The Catholic church, 
for example, did everything to prevent their members from applying any form of birth control 
(Schoonheim 2005; Schoonheim & Hülsken 2011). More recently, scholars have pointed out 
the role of diffusion mechanism, depending on social networks and the family with regard to 
the spread of birth control techniques (Bras 2014; Szreter 1996; Van Bavel 2004).  
Although the first demographic transition model has generally turned out to be a good 
description of the development of fertility and mortality, important deviations from the model 
have been observed as well. In France, for example, fertility decline preceded mortality 
decline. Next, the post-war baby boom caused in several Western and non-Western countries, 
an unexpected upheaval in fertility, which was not anticipated in Notestein’s model (Van 
Bavel & Reher 2013). However, the largest deviation from the model is probably illustrated 
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by the baby-bust of the late 1960s, which paved the way to sub-replacement fertility. That is 
the moment where according to Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk van de Kaa (1986), a second 
demographic transition started.  
 
Graph 1: The first demographic transition model 
 
The second demographic transition 
Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk van de Kaa (1986) pointed out that the second demographic 
transition started in North-Western Europe, and from there will spread gradually to other parts 
of the globe. The main characteristics of this transition are continued sub-replacement 
fertility, rising numbers of childlessness couples, drops in marriage and remarriage rates, and 
rising celibacy, cohabitation, divorce and extra-marital fertility. Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa 
link those demographic trends and contrast them to the main characteristics of the first 
demographic transition. Whereas declining fertility during the first transition is perceived as 
an altruistic decision of parents to make sure that every child would fare better by reducing 
resource dilution, below-replacement fertility is described as the outcome of individual 
choices (Van de Kaa 1987). The ‘king-child era’ has been replaced by a ‘king-couple’ (Ariès 
1980; Van de Kaa 2004). Not only has the motivation behind fertility decline shifted, also the 
means to achieve it. Whereas birth control during the first transition was mainly practiced by 
withdrawal and rhythm, more reliable ways of family planning (the pill and the IUD) have 
become common practices during the second transition (Lesthaeghe 2010). As contraception 
became more reliable, the ties between sex and  reproduction became weaker (Zwaan 1993).  
C
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In terms of nuptiality the second demographic transition is also a strong turning point. 
During the first transition men and women married more often and younger, during the 
second demographic transition, marriage was increasingly delayed, and more and more people 
never married. Moreover divorce, which had been a rarity during the first transition, became a 
common occurrence during the second transition, on the principle that ‘a good divorce is 
better than a bad marriage’ (Lesthaeghe 2010: 212). Simultaneously, cohabitation became 
increasingly popular, first as a prelude to marriage, then as a substitute and finally as a 
postlude of matrimony. The next step was to disentangle the link between marriage and 
reproduction. From the 1980s on, a large increase in the numbers of births out of wedlock was 
observed in many North-Western European countries, illustrating that for many young people 
marriage had become completely obsolete (Zwaan 1993).  
Deep societal and ideational changes are supposed to drive the second demographic 
transition. Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa (1986) mention the shift from a society based on 
solidarity, in which the family functioned as a linchpin towards a society in which individual 
autonomy and self-fulfillment are the new devices. This shift embraces profound changes in 
gender-roles, a de-standardization of the life course (Elzinga & Liefbroer 2007), and a waning 
influence of traditional powers, like the state and the church 
The second demographic transition theory has not remained uncontested. Scholars 
have argued that there is only one transition and that the post-1965 developments are a 
continuation of the first transition or a special feature of it (Cliquet 1992; Coleman 2004). 
Next, sub-replacement fertility, one of the main features of the second demographic transition, 
already  existed in the inter-war period (Van Bavel 2010). This raises doubts about the onset 
of the second transition. Moreover, as there is no clear endpoint, the concept of transition 
might actually not apply. After all, there is no clear shift from one equilibrium to another 
(Sobotka 2006). Next, ideational changes may not have been the drivers behind changes in 
fertility and nuptiality. For Belgium, Neels and De Wachter (2010) made assumable that post-
1970 changes in union formation and fertility are instead related to structural changes in 
society than to value changes towards reproduction. Last but not least, it has been questioned 
whether the second demographic transition will actually spread from North-Western Europe 
to other parts of Europe and even to other continents (Liefbroer & Fokkema 2008). 
 
2 The demographic transition in the Arab world 
 
Mortality decline 
It was not before the era of European colonial rule (roughly the latter half of the nineteenth till 
the middle of the twentieth century) that a structural decline in mortality took place (Tabutin 
& Schoumaker 2005: 515).
1
 The colonial powers, notably the French and English,
2
 introduced 
                                                 
1
 In Algeria colonization started already in 1830.  
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all kind of measures to improve the health and life-expectancy. Among those measures were 
improvements in hygiene (notably sanitation programs in urban areas), the introduction of  
vaccination programs, increased use of antibiotics, and the establishment of health care 
services. However, only by the middle of the twentieth century, major epidemic diseases like 
cholera, typhus and malaria had disappeared (Tabutin & Schoumaker 2005: 515)  
After independence, improvements in health services have decreased mortality further. 
There are, however, big differences in the level and development between and within 
countries. This has to do with differences in living standards, economic growth, and the 
density and quality of health services. In the oil-producing countries of the Gulf, economic 
growth and increasing living standards went hand in hand, and in many of these countries 
medical treatment in health services is for free (Al-Qudsi 2010). As a result, life-expectancy 
rose and inequalities in health between socio-economic classes are relatively small. Elsewhere 
in the Arab world, differences in health reflect social inequalities, as the poorest part of the 
population lives not only under worse conditions, but also suffers from limited access to 
health care (Akl et al. 2007; Al-Qudsi 2010).   
 
Graph 2: The demographic transition in Algeria, 1876-2010  
Source:  Tabutin, Vilquin & Biraben (2002) p.13; United Nations World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision.  
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Graph 3: The demographic transition in Egypt, 1907-2010  
 
Source: Tabutin, Vilquin & Biraben (2002) p.13 ; United Nations World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision. 
 
Due to the absence of reliable statistics for most countries in the Arab region, it is hard to 
describe the decline of mortality before the middle of the twentieth century. Egypt and 
Algeria are two exceptions, as these countries disposed already during the first decades of 
twentieth century of a reliable vital registration system. In Algeria, a slow but structural 
decline of mortality occurred during the first four decades of the twentieth century. Before 
and during the struggle for independence (1940s and 1950s) mortality rose steadily. However, 
from the 1960s on, mortality started to decline again, this time at a faster speed. In Egypt, a 
structural decline in mortality started in the 1920s, an interruption occurred in the 1940s, and 
mortality decline continued in the latter half of the twentieth century. 
Around the middle of the twentieth century, large differences in mortality existed 
among the Arab countries. In countries like Kuwait, Qatar and Lebanon crude death rates 
were relatively low (12‰ to 15‰), while Somalia (32‰) and Yemen (29‰) had high rates. 
In other Arab countries, death rates fluctuated between 20‰ and 25‰. During the latter part 
of the twentieth and the first decades of the twenty-first century, mortality decline continued 
in all countries. As a result, in the period 2005-2010, most countries had a crude death rate 
below 7‰, except for Somalia (15‰), Mauretania (10‰), and Sudan (9‰). The lowest rates 
are observed in the Gulf States, especially the United Arab Emirates (1‰), Qatar (2‰) and 
Bahrain (3‰). 
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Graph 4: Increasing Life Expectancy at Birth in Several Arab Countries (both sexes) 
 
Source:  United Nations World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision 
 
Declining mortality, especially among infants and children, results in considerable increases 
in life expectancy at birth (Tabutin & Schoumaker 2005: 594). All countries in the region 
made progress, but there are differences. In the Gulf countries, life expectancy is close to 
Western European levels. Countries like Somalia and Mauretania, lag behind. In Somalia e.g., 
life expectancy at birth (both sexes combined) has risen from 33,2 to 55,2 years in the period 
1950-2010. In the same period, life expectancy in Qatar increased from 54,7 to 77,9 years. In 
both countries some 22 years were added to the life-expectancy at birth, but there are still 
differences, mainly as a result of differences in living standards, economic development, 
educational attainment, and quality, availability and access of health care.  
 
Population growth 
Like Europe in the past, the Arab world experiences a population explosion today. Population 
growth in the Arab world is, however, considerably larger. North Africa and the Middle East 
turned into the second fastest growing world region after Sub-Saharan Africa (Dhonte, 
Bhattacharya & Yousef 2000; Roudi-Fahimi & Mederios Kent 2007). The population of the 
Arab World grew from about 76 million inhabitants in 1950 to 359 million in 2010 (graph 6). 
This growth is almost completely the result of natural population growth. 
 
  
33 
39,1 
42,9 
55,9 
40,5 
45,2 
54,7 55,2 
57,5 
69,6 
72 73,1 
75,9 
77,9 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Somalia Mauretania Morocco Lebanon Saoudi
Arabia
United Arab
Emirates
Qatar
1950-1955
2005-2010
12 
 
Graph 5: Natural increase (%) in Arab countries, 1950-2010 
 
Source:  United Nations World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision 
 
Graph 6: Estimated total population of Arab world and sub-regions, 1950-2050* 
 
* Projections 2010-2050 (Medium Variant) 
Source: United Nations World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision  
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Thanks to declining fertility, rates of natural increase are slowing down in the Arab World 
(graph 5). In countries like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Lebanon, the decrease is 
pronounced. In most Arab countries the natural increase rate is now below 1,5%. In Lebanon 
it is even below 1%. However, in Egypt, with a population of more than 81 million 
inhabitants (the most populous country in the Arab world), the natural increase rate declined 
only from 2,68% (1985-1990) to 1,87% (2005-2010). Djibouti has a high natural increase rate 
of 1,89%, but for the other peripheral Southern Arab States the figures are considerably 
higher: Mauritania 2,47%, Sudan 2,44%, Somalia 2,87%, Yemen 3,16%. Natural increase will 
stay higher in the peripheral states than in the rest of the Arab world during the next decades 
as fertility decline has only recently took off in these countries.  
 
Table 2: Net-migration rates in Arab countries, 1960-1965/2005-2010 
 
  1960-1965 2005-2010 
Maghreb Morocco -3,3 -3,6 
Algeria -11,2 -0,9 
Tunisia -10,1 -0,4 
Lybia 6,2 -0,7 
Mashreq Egypt -0,3 -0,9 
Jordan 7,1 7 
Syria -0,6 -0,6 
Lebanon 1,9 -0,6 
Palestine -13,7 -4,7 
Iraq 0 -1 
Gulf Kuwait 82,1 22,2 
Saudia Arabia 5,7 8,2 
Qatar 54,4 132,9 
United Arab Emirates 62,5 106,3 
Oman -3,4 11,7 
Periphery Mauritania -0,4 0,6 
Sudan -1 0,7 
Djibouti 35,7 0 
Somalia -0,1 -6,8 
Yemen -3,7 -1,2 
  
Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects 
 
Although for the Arab world as a whole, natural population growth is close to total population 
growth, this is not the case for the sub-regions. This has to do with differences in net-
migration. While the Maghreb and Mashreq-countries, apart from Jordan, are considered 
sending areas, the Gulf states are marked net-receivers. As a result, in Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq, total population growth is tempered 
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by migration, while in Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab 
Emirates total population growth is strongly reinforced by immigration.  
Notwithstanding the fact that fertility levels and natural rates of increase are declining in most 
countries, the demographic explosion in the Arab World has not yet come to an end. 
According to the projections of the United Nations (medium variant), the population of the 
Arab World will grow to 400 million inhabitants by 2015, 500 million by 2030 and 600 
million by 2045. The peripheral countries in the Southern Arab World and the Mashreq 
countries will have the highest growth rates. Lowest growth rates are found in the Maghreb 
countries, where the combination of considerable emigration and low fertility rates will lead 
to moderate population growth.  
 
Graph 7: Mortality decline in Arab countries, 1950-2010 (crude death rates)
 
 
Fertility decline  
It was only during the period of independence that fertility started to decline in the Arab 
World. Towards the middle of the twentieth century, differences in fertility among the 
countries were small. The total fertility rate fluctuated around 7; the only exception was 
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Lebanon, with a total fertility rate of 5,7 in 1950 (estimations United Nations). Compared to 
other developing countries, fertility was high in the Arab countries, as ages at marriage were 
low, marriage almost universal, and child-bearing highly valued (Casterline 2009: 5). Pre-
transitional fertility rates in the Arab countries were the highest in the world (Rashad 2000). 
Since most Arab societies around the middle of the twentieth century had no social 
security system, the family played a central role in social life. Care for the sick, elderly, 
disabled and economically deprived persons was a family affair. This explains why marriage 
was early and almost universal, and why fertility was high, far into the twentieth century 
(Roudi-Fahimi & Kent 2007: 8). Moreover, Muslim culture encourages marriage and family 
formation, as those events are believed to strengthen the individual, the family and the 
Ummah, i.e. the world’s Muslim community (Bowen 1981: 19; Omran 1992). 
Until 1965 no structural decline in fertility is observed in the Arab countries, apart 
from Lebanon. However, towards the end of the 1960s, the fertility transition initiated in 
Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Palestine, Qatar and the 
United Arab Emirates followed in the period 1970-1975. A late start of fertility decline 
occurred in Algeria, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen.  
There are considerable differences regarding pace of decline. Pioneering countries, 
like Egypt, experience a slower decline than latecomers, like Algeria & Oman. This is not true 
for Sudan and Mauretania, where fertility decline started late, but the pace of decline was 
slow. Extremely slow fertility decline is observed in Mauretania and Somalia. Remarkable 
drops are observed for Algeria, Oman and the United Arab Emirates.  
As a consequence of differences in the start and pace of the decline, the disparity in 
fertility levels has increased over time. Today, there are Arab countries where the total 
fertility rate is still above 5, like in Yemen and Somalia. On the other hand, in countries like 
Algeria, Lebanon, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates, fertility is below replacement level. 
Apart from differences in fertility between countries, there are differences between 
regions within countries, and between rural and urban areas. Generally speaking, fertility is 
lower in urban areas than in the countryside. There seems to be a link between the level of 
urbanization and the level of fertility. Likewise, fertility is linked to literacy rates, per capita 
GDP, contraceptive prevalence and  (infant) mortality levels (Eberstadt & Shah 2011: 19).   
Like mortality decline, fertility decline initiated later in the Arab world than in 
Western society, but evolved at a faster speed, since more effective techniques to 
control/decrease fertility were available. Moreover, rapid decline in fertility was facilitated by 
the fact that Islam provided less cultural and religious resistance against birth control. 
Compared to the Christian Church, and especially the Roman Catholic Church, the modern 
Ulama – the  educated class of Muslim legal scholars – perceived family planning usually as a 
practice that was not against the will of God. Most Muslim legal scholars have reasoned that 
the Quran does not forbid couples to space and to limit the number of births. Moreover, they 
reason that family planning is not against Islam as coitus interruptus (azl) was already 
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practiced at the time the prophet Mohammed lived; he knew about it and did not forbid it. 
Consequently, most of the Ulama have agreed that family planning is allowed if both the 
husband and the wife agree, and the sexual pleasure of the wife is not denied (Roudi-Fahimi 
2004). As a result of this rather liberal point of view, there has been only minor religious 
opposition against the establishment of family planning programs in most Arab countries. 
Some religious leaders, like the Egyptian theologian and jurist Mahmut Shaltut even strongly 
supported these programs (Bowen 1981: 169).
3
  
There is however, a more important reason why fertility declined fast in the Arab 
World. Whereas in Europe, fertility decline was accompanied by a decrease in average ages at 
first marriage and proportions of lifetime singles, fertility decline in the Arab world was 
coupled with a systematic incline in the age at first marriage, and the proportions of lifetime 
singles stayed roughly similar to prior levels (Engelen & Puschmann 2011a). Rashad and 
Khadr (2002) have shown that marriage decline in the Arab countries has played a larger role 
in fertility decline than family planning. In Algeria, fertility decline between 1977 and 1992 
was more or less completely a result of marriage change. In Morocco a 3,59-decline in total 
fertility rate occurred between 1961/1963 and 1995; 65% of this change was due to changes in 
marital status and 35% was due to changes in marital fertility. In Tunisia, rising ages at 
marriage account for about two thirds of the decline in total fertility between 1966 and 1988. 
In Jordan, 81% of changes in fertility in the period 1961-1990 was the result of rising ages at 
marriage (Rashad & Khadr 2002: 42). 
Within the Arab World, high fertility and total population growth rates have been 
perceived as major challenges to development. In countries like Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt, 
fast population growth was quickly perceived as a threat. As a result, national family planning 
programs were established in the 1960s and 1970s. Countries in the Mashreq region saw a 
less urge to temper population growth. Until the middle of the 1970s the Syrian government, 
for example, still stimulated population growth by giving premiums to large families and 
forbidding contraception and its promotion. Things changed, however, as the 1970 census 
made clear that fast population growth had caused unemployment and that many extra 
governmental expenditures were needed to provide the population with food, education and 
health care. Towards the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s the attitude of the Syrian 
government changed, as it turned into an advocate of family planning (Winckler 1998: 457).  
The Gulf countries have longer kept on following a pro-natalist policy, as these 
countries were obviously in want of a larger labor force, which is also indicated by their large 
immigration ratios. However, in the 1990s, Qatar and Kuwait started to make family planning 
services available, and Saudi Arabia moved away from a restrictive point of view towards an 
                                                 
3
 Most of the religious opposition has been on the local level, as less educated Muslim leaders oftentimes thought 
that birth control intervened with Gods will and was thus haram (forbidden by god). Moreover, some religious 
leaders have reasoned that limited population growth would weaken the Ummah (the larger Muslim community). 
Political opposition against birth control has been widespread in the Arab countries at times when family 
planning programs were introduced (Bowen 1981; Winckler 1998)   
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indirect support (Population Division 2003:23). Contraceptive use in the Gulf is lower than in 
the rest of the Arab World except for the Southern Arab States, where only recently family 
planning programs have been adopted.  
Thanks to marriage decline, fertility started to decrease in most of the Arab countries 
years before governments realized that there was a real problem and started to implement 
family planning programs.  
 
Graph 8: Fertility decline in Arab countries, 1950-2010 (TFR) 
 
 
3 The Marriage Revolution in the Arab World 
 
Marriage in the Arab world has undergone such profound changes during the previous 
decades that scholars have started to talk about a marriage revolution (Rashad & Osman 2003; 
Tabutin & Schoumaker 2005). Ages at first marriage have risen considerably, especially 
among females. Around the middle of the twentieth century, females in Morocco, Algeria, 
Mauretania, Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia married on average between their eighteenth and 
twentieth, and it was not uncommon that girls married between 12 and 15. Today ages have 
gone up. In several Arab countries the singulate mean ages at marriage (SMAM) among 
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females have risen to around 30, and considerable proportions of women marry in their 
thirties.  
 
Graph 9: Singulate mean ages at marriage among males 
 
Source: Source: United Nations, World Marriage Data 2008 
 
Legal changes, prolonged education and increasing labor participation of women, are three 
main factors why ages at first marriage have increased. In several Arab countries minimum 
ages at marriage have been established, and in other countries the minimum age at marriage 
has been heightened (Roudi-Fahimi 2010). On average, the higher a girl is educated, the later 
she marries. Rashad and Osman (2003: 26-29) have shown that for uneducated females 
chances of being married in age category 20-24, were at least twice (Tunisia and Egypt), and 
in some countries even three times higher (Algeria and Yemen) than for girls who had 
finished their secondary school. Education keeps girls temporarily away from the marriage 
market. Entering matrimony is supposed to occur only once education is finished. At the same 
time education might make females more selective in their partner choice (Marks 2011b: 26).  
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Graph 10: Singulate mean ages at marriage among females 
 
Source: Source: United Nations, World Marriage Data 2008 
 
Paid labor among women is another factor which tends to increase age at marriage. Although 
females in the Arab World have the lowest employment rates in the world (Fargues 2005: 46), 
important change has taken place recently (graph 11). Ever since 1985, the percentage of 
women in the labor force has increased in many Arab countries.  
Another reason why ages at marriage have risen, is the transition from arranged 
marriages to free partner choice. In the past, it was common that parents chose a partner for 
their children (Khlat 1997; Olmsted 2011). Today, a majority of youngsters is allowed to 
choose their marriage partner (Rashad, Osman & Roudi-Fahimi 2005). Arranged marriages 
usually occur earlier on in life, since the parents of the groom and bride can start the quest for 
a marriage early on. In the case of free choice, males and females start their search when they 
are mature (Carmichael 2011; Carmichael, De Moor & Van Zanden 2011).   
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Graph 11: Percentage of females (ages 15+) active at the labor market 
 
 
Skewed sex-ratios at marriageable ages are another reason why ages at first marriage have 
risen. This is especially the case for Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, which received in 
the recent past unaccompanied male migrants, working mainly in oil-industry and 
construction (McFalls 2007: 21). As a consequence, there has arisen a female shortage at the 
marriage market, which makes it harder for males to find a partner. This is a reason why men 
in that region often search their partner outside their country of residence (Rashad, Osman & 
Roudi-Fahimi 2005).  
The rising cost of wedding is another cause of marriage postponement. Towards the 
end of the 1990s the average cost of a wedding in Egypt amounted up to about $6,000, while 
yearly GNP per capita income was only $1,490 (Singerman & Ibrahim 2001). That explains 
why young men and their families spent years to save sufficient money.
4
 Among other things, 
money needs to be saved for the wedding party, the Shabka (consisting of rings or gold), the 
dowry, housing, furniture, electronic devices (televisions, satellite antennas, refrigerators, 
etc.). 
 
  
                                                 
4
 Traditionally, 3/4th of the costs of the marriage are bearded by the groom and its family. However, an 
increasing number of brides and their families are willing to share a larger part of the costs of getting married. 
Increased labor participation of females facilitates this development.  
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Graph 12: Skewed Sex-ratios in the United Arab Emirates, 2010 
 
 
Graph 13: Skewed Sex-ratios in Qatar 
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The trend towards more expansive wedding parties and bridal gifts started in the Gulf 
Countries when oil business reached a high in the 1970s and marriage celebrations grew 
larger and larger. However, when the oil boom was over, more men in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, 
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates were no longer able to afford such an expensive start of 
marriage, which had become the expected norm. As a result, more men started to search 
partners from abroad, who had less costly expectations. To counter-act that native females 
stayed more and more single, marriage fund-foundations were established. The United Arab 
Emirates’ Marriage Foundation, for example, intends to support marriages between UAE-
nationals by reducing the cost of a wedding. If a man from the UAE has an income below a 
certain level and intents to marry a woman from the UAE, he might apply for a wedding grant 
(Rashad, Osman & Roudi-Fahimi 2005: 6). 
The unaffordability of marriage has led to an incline in non-conventional forms of 
marriage, like urfi, misyar and muta’a marriages (Singerman 2007; Rashad, Osman & Roudi-
Fahimi 2005). These marriages are clandestine, secretive and not covered by public 
administration, as marriage partners sign their own certificates. Partners engaging in such 
arrangements mostly do not share a household on a permanent basis, they rather meet in hotel 
rooms, apartments or flats (Singerman 2007: 29). Such non-conventional marriages are 
especially attractive for males, as they do not include wedding parties and reduce the financial 
responsibilities of men towards their wives. Notwithstanding the large attention to the 
phenomenon in the media, estimations suggest that only a small proportion of the population 
engages in non-conventional marriages. For Egypt, Sahar El-Tawila and Zeinab Khadr (2004) 
estimated that only 4 percent of the population in the age-category 18-30 was engaged in urfi 
marriages. Among students it amounted up to 6% (Singerman 2007: 29). 
Apart from rising ages at marriage and the rise of non-conventional marriages, a 
decline in polygamy is observable as well (Tabutin & Schoumaker 2005). Polygamy has 
never been widely spread in the Arab world, but has always been a part of the marriage 
system, as Islamic law allows a man to marry up to four women as long as he is able to 
provide for them and treat them equally. Only in Tunisia polygamy has been forbidden by law 
(in 1956, Tabutin & Schoumaker 2005). Recently more limitations on polygamy have been 
implemented in several Arab countries. For example, the new family code in Morocco permits 
a woman to add a clause to the marriage certificate in which she expresses that her husband is 
not allowed to marry a second wife. 
While so many changes regarding marriage have occurred previously, it is striking that 
consanguinity has stayed a specific feature of marriage in the Arab world. Traditionally, Arab 
Muslims and Christians prefer sons to marry a daughter of their father’s brother. Family 
honor, modesty, family solidarity and property consolidation have been put forward as the 
most important reasons why this type of cousin marriage, which outside North Africa and the 
Middle East is rare, functions as an ideal in the Arab world (Khlat 1997). In some Arab 
countries consanguinity decreased, in others it expanded (Tadmouri et al. 2009).  
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4. A second demographic transition?  
 
Declining marriage is a characteristic of the second demographic transition in Europe, and has 
been interpreted as an outcome of the weakening of the institution of marriage and the 
empowerment of women. Since for several decades ages at marriage in the Arab World are on 
the rise, females are enjoying more education, the number of women that perform paid labor 
is growing, women’s rights are improving, and modern forms of birth control (pill and IUD) 
are used more frequently, one could argue that the Arab World has entered the second 
demographic transition. However, simultaneously important features of this transition are 
(still) absent or are only present in an embryonic phase (table 3).  
Marriage decline in Europe (roughly from 1970 on) took the form of rising ages at 
first marriage, growing rates of cohabitation, an increasing number of births out of wedlock, 
and a strong incline in divorce rates (Van de Kaa 1987). Such a weakening of the marriage 
institution has not been observed in the Arab countries, although the legal and socio-economic 
position of women has improved and non-conventional forms of marriage have risen in the 
recent past. The age at first marriage increased, but marriage has stayed more or less 
universal. Crude marriage rates have inclined in most Arab countries over the previous 
decades (table 4), while the percentage of ever-married in the age category 45-49 saw only 
minor changes (table 5). Only in Lebanon a rise in permanent celibacy is observable.  
 
Table 4: Crude Marriage Rates, 1970-today 
Countries Around 1970 Around 1985 Around 1995 
2000 or later 
Second latest Latest 
Algeria 4,7 5,6 5,5 8,5 9,6 
Iraq 4,1 8,0 5,6 6,8 9,6 
Qatar 3,1 3,0 2,8 3,4 3,7 
Lebanon 7,9  8,8 7,4 7,2 
Libya 7,3 4,9 4,8 5,3 6,0 
Saudi Arabia   3,4 4,6 5,2 
Syria 9,9 8,9 8,5 10,7 10,6 
Source: World Marriage Data 
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Table 3: Summary of most important features and developments related to the first and second demographic transition in Europe and the Arab 
countries. 
 
     Europe       Arab world 
 
Mortality decline   Gradual: 18-20
th
 century     Fast: 20
th
 century   
 
Fertility decline   Gradual: ±1850-1965     Very Fast: 1960 - today 
     Result of traditional forms of birth control   Result of rising ages at marriages and traditional and modern 
            contraception within marriage 
 
Nuptiality    Declining ages at marriage    Rising ages at marriage 
     Increase in marriage intensity    No major change in marriage intensity  
 
 Union Formation:   No or very few cohabitation    No or very few cohabitation  
 
Population growth  Strong       Extremely strong 
  
  
Union Formation   Rise in consensual union     Consensual unions are rare or non-existent.  
Rise in non-conventional marriages  
       
 Marriage   Diminishing interest in marriage    Marriages stays a prime goal in life   
     Rising ages at marriage     Rising ages at marriage 
     Decline in marriage intensity    Marriage is still universal 
 
 Divorce    Strong rise in divorce rates    No clear rise in divorces; partially even decline 
 
Fertility    From 1965 on below-replacement fertility   Most recently below-replacement fertility, mainly in certain urban
            areas 
 
Contraception   Modern techniques; self-fulfilling conception  Modern techniques; mainly preventive contraception 
    
 Births out of wedlock  Strong rise from 1980 on     Marginal phenomenon      
 
Sexuality   In- and outside marriage; Weakened link with love,  Mainly restricted to marriage; rise in non-penetrative pre-  
marriage and fertility  marital sex. Brides are still supposed to enter marriage as a virgin 
Still a strong link between, love, sex, marriage and Reproduction 
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Table 5: Ever-married at ages 45-49 
 1970's 2000's 
 Females Males Females Males 
Algeria 98,8 97,5 96,2 97,7 
Morocco 97,7 96,6 93,2 93,3 
Lebanon 93,1 94,3 87,7 93,1 
Syria 97,6 97,3 95,4 98,5 
Jordan 97,6 98,4 94,6 97,8 
Bahrain 98,1 92,2 91,2 91,7 
Egypt 96,1 96,2 98,3 n.a. 
Source: World Marriage Data 2008 
n.a.: not available 
 
Although data on cohabitation and births out of wedlock in the Arab countries are scarce or 
even non-existent, there is reason to believe that both are small-scale phenomena, as they are 
taboo and in many countries against the law (Olmsted 2011: 410; Youssef  1973: 334-335). In 
the United Arab Emirates, for example, cohabitation and giving birth to a child out of 
wedlock is illegal and can lead to imprisonment. In the case of foreign nationals, it can also 
lead to deportation (Kirdar 2010.). Under such circumstances, cohabitation and births out of 
wedlock can only be marginal.   
When it comes to divorce, no systematic increase has been observed, and in some 
countries (such as Egypt and Libya) an opposite trend is taking place (table 6). Declining 
divorce rates are likely related to rising ages at marriage, to the transition to free partner 
choice, and to the improved rights of women. Early marriages lead more often to divorce 
(Roudi-Fahimi 2010 2011), and the same is probably true for arranged marriages. As both 
phenomena are declining, unions become more stable. In the past, divorce was more 
widespread in the Arab world as males could easily divorce and remarry, while that was not 
true for women. By only recalling three time ‘You are repudiated’, and reporting this to the 
local authorities, a man could divorce his wife (Naamane Guessous 1990; Tabutin & 
Schoumaker 2005). Due to legal changes, this is in several countries (for example Morocco) 
no longer possible. Furthermore, legal changes have led to increased financial obligations 
towards divorced women, which  makes men less willing to divorce. 
Traditional ideas around sexuality and family formation, for example that a women 
should enter marriage as a virgin, are still much alive among the Muslim population in the 
region. In conservative circles, the ritual in which a blood-stained sheet is shown to the guests 
at the wedding night, as sign that the woman has been deflowered, is still practiced. 
Moreover, medical virginity tests and the rush on hymen restore surgery’s do illustrate that 
women are still expected to stay virgin before marriage (De Jong, et al. 2005: 53). This is 
another reason to believe that the recent changes in marriage and fertility do not (fully) match 
the concept of the second demographic transition. In the Western World, the second 
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demographic transition went hand in hand with a gradual disentanglement of the links 
between love, marriage, sexuality and reproduction (Zwaan 2004: 66). Such a 
disentanglement has not (yet) been observed for the Arab world as love, sexuality and 
reproduction are in principle still a prerogative for married people. However, in principle it is 
perfectly feasible that the next generation of young people in the Arab world will experience  
a cultural and a sexual revolution similar to Europe in the 1960s. There are signs that 
changing attitudes and behaviors are underway. A recent study showed that in Rabat, young 
men and women are increasingly practicing pre-marital non-penetrative sexual activities 
(Bakass & Ferrand 2013). These groups might very well pave the way towards a demographic 
transition similar to Europe. However, cultural and religious opposition against such a new 
development will be great and for the moment marriage is still a holy institution.  
 
Table 6: Crude Divorce Rates, 1970-today  
Country Around 1970 Around 1985 Around 1990 
2000 or later 
Second Latest Latest 
Egypt 2 1,6 1,1 0,9 0,9 
Lebanon 0,6 1 1,1 1,2 1,1 
Iraq 0,4 0,1 1,5 .. .. 
Libya 2 0,9 0,3 0,3 0,3 
Palestine .. .. 1,3 1,1 1 
Qatar 1,6 0,8 0,9 0,8 1 
Syria 0,6 0,6 0,8 0,9 1 
United Arab 
Emirates 
.. .. 0,9 0,9 0,9 
Source: World Marriage Data 2008 
 
5 Reducing the demographic divide 
 
The world is roughly divided in countries characterized by high life-expectancy, low fertility 
(an old population) and (upcoming) population decrease, and countries with low life-
expectancy, high fertility (a young population) and population growth. Hence the term 
demographic divide (Kent & Haub 2005). Although demographic variables are not the only 
determinant of wealth and well-being, high fertility and massive population growth frequently 
form a barrier to economic development (other factors remaining equal). Most countries with 
high population growth are also countries with high poverty, high illiteracy, endemic health 
problems, and little-developed infrastructure (Kent & Haub 2005). 
The so-called quantity-quality trade-off explains the challenges of high fertility and 
high population growth to a large degree (Becker 1960). Parents have a limited number of 
resources available which they have to divide among their offspring. Consequently, the more 
children in a family, the less resources remain for each individual child. The resource dilution 
model stipulates that the chances of receiving high quality education, health care, housing, et 
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cetera decreases as the number of siblings increases. The decline of fertility opens up the road 
to the upbringing of so-called high-quality children.  
High fertility and population growth also lead to challenges on the state-level. Instead 
of using tax revenues to invest in the quality of public services, more money is needed to 
supply the growing population with existing services. Instead of investing in the quality of 
education (better buildings, more equipment in the form of books, computers, sophisticated 
methods), developing countries with high population growth spend most of their educational 
budget in building new schools and contracting more teachers. As a consequence the quality 
of education often lags behind (out-of-date schoolbooks, no or limited computer equipment, 
old-fashioned methods of instruction). Comparable challenges are found in the fields of 
health-care, infrastructure, transportation and housing (Kent & Haub 2005).  
High population growth also causes environmental problems. In the long run,  growth 
leads to scarcity of arable land, insufficient water, overgrazing, deforestation, desertification, 
air and water pollution, and depletion of natural resources. In this sense, population growth 
adds to the destruction of ecosystems, and reduces the earth’s (re)producing capacities. 
Population growth can generate or reinforce natural disasters, famines and political conflicts. 
All these factors form a challenge for the Arab World, as is proven by massive rural-to-urban 
migration, high-speed urbanization, growing shantytowns, rising food imports, growing 
water-scarcity, desertification and high unemployment rates among young people. Because of 
high population pressure in the countryside, and limited resources in the form of employment, 
arable land, water resources, millions of Arab country-dwellers made in the course of the 
twentieth century their way to major cities in the hope of finding employment and a better 
living in regions with expanding industry and/or services. In the case of cities like Cairo, 
Alexandria, Damascus, Casablanca and Algiers, more migrants moved to the city than jobs 
were created and affordable dwellings were constructed. As a result, shantytowns arose and 
illegal housing expanded in major Arab cities (Puschmann 2011). In that sense, a relocation of 
poverty and misery from the countryside to the cities occurred, creating major challenges for 
the urban authorities.  
Rapid population growth in combination with ongoing rural-to-urban migration also 
leads to food and water shortages. Water availability per capita has been declining over the 
last decades (Al-Weshah 2002). This means that the countries in the region become more 
dependent on water and food supply from abroad, and that the risk of political conflicts rises.  
Family planning may help to reduce population growth and its negative effects on 
development. Gradually the balance between demographic expansion and economic 
development can be restored, which will open up new opportunities. Programs to tackle 
poverty, improve living standards, eradicate shantytowns, improve housing conditions are 
more likely to be successful if population growth is tempered. Quality investments in 
education, health-care and infrastructure will increase human development and improve the 
region’s competitiveness. Declines in population growth will help to avoid natural disasters 
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and will limit the region’s dependence on food and water supply from abroad. Equally, 
unemployment will decrease as the influx of young people at the labor market is reduced. The 
reduction of offspring will lead to capital concentration, which in combination with increased 
education opens up new possibilities for investments. Finally the accelerated decline of 
fertility and population growth will decrease rates of rural-to-urban migration and will open 
up new possibilities to reorganize the urban environment. 
 
6. Empowerment of women and the end of patriarchy?  
Since women only enter marriage at later ages and since age differences between spouses are 
becoming smaller, women’s bargaining position and agency within the family and society is 
growing. Whereas previously, adult life started with marriage and family formation, females 
in the Arab countries today enjoy a prolonged period of single life in their family of 
orientation. This opens up new opportunities: more and more girls go longer to school  and 
participate in the labor market. The gap in literacy rates between girls and boys has largely 
disappeared, and at universities females are already better represented than males (Courbage 
2014, this volume). Many young females in the Arab world today are not only better educated 
than their mothers, they are also better educated than their fathers and husbands. In the long 
run, this might break down the patriarchal system (Fargues 2005: 47).  
When it comes to labor participation women still lag behind, as paid labor is until 
today largely dominated by males. Nevertheless, major increases in the proportions of women 
that perform paid labor outside the household has been observed and there is reason to believe 
that women contribute, in fact, already more to the economy, because women’s work is highly 
under-registered (Fargues 2005: 46; Fernea 2000). Women actually dominate certain fields of 
the labor market, like education, social work and domestic work, while in fields like justice, 
journalism, television and advertising, they are making major leaps forward. At the same time 
female leadership is becoming more common. Women occupy important executive posts in 
politics, religious organizations and non-governmental organizations (Fernea 2000). These 
new opportunities are made possible by supportive legal changes. In Morocco, for example, a 
law was passed in 2002 which assured that women had to have at least 10% seats in 
parliament.  
As women are making progress outside the household, their position is also 
strengthening within the household. They enjoy more power over the household’s resources 
and consequently have a greater say in decisions related to spending (health care, clothes, 
shoes, make-up, etc). Women also have more influence on the purchase of expensive items, 
like real estate and cars. Moreover, women’s agency has improved as they more often 
successfully –with or without a veil – surpass the borders between the private and the public 
domain. This is possible because marriage occurs only later in life and the number of children 
is small. As a result women spend more time on non-reproductive related activities.  
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Since the mean age at marriage increases faster among women than among men, the 
age gap between spouses has grown smaller. This results in an increase in the bargaining 
power of women within the family. In general small differences in age between spouses have 
been interpreted as an indicator of more egalitarian relationships. In relationships in which 
men are older than their female partner, men enjoy advantages regarding status, experience 
and power (Van de Putte, et al.: 1235). With the trend towards age-homogamy these 
advantages of men are declining.  
In certain regions in the Arab World, for example in Egypt, marriages in which 
females are older than their husbands (in the past a rare phenomenon) have recently become 
considerably more frequent (Osman & Shahd 2003). In these ‘younger husband-older wife 
marriages’, females have generally spoken more power than in the conventional ‘older 
husband-younger wife  marriage’, not only because of the age difference, but also because of 
educational and occupational advantages, which usually go hand in hand with this type of 
marriage. Males in the Arab world, especially from the lower social strata, increasingly marry 
older females from the higher social strata – especially divorced, widowed or single females 
who surpassed the socially acceptable age at marriage – because they cannot afford the costs 
of marriage with younger females (Osman & Shahd 2003). The women who marry a 
considerably younger husband avoid marginalization by entering matrimony, while at the 
same time they increase their power, as their husbands are less experienced, less educated and 
financially dependent. 
 
Table 7: Gender-Inequality Index 
Country 1995 2000 2005 2008 2011 
Algeria 0,46 0,52 0,46 0,43 0,41 
Egypt 0,67 0,65 0,60 0,58 n.a. 
Jordan 0,64 0,60 0,51 0,48 0,46 
Kuwait 0,59 0,44 0,36 0,30 0,23 
Libya 0,67 .. 0,37 0,33 0,31 
Morocco 0,71 0,69 0,54 0,53 0,51 
Saudi Arabia .. .. 0,68 0,69 0,65 
Sudan 0,72 .. 0,65 0,63 0,61 
Source: United Nations, Human Development Reports  
 
That relationships are becoming more equal and that gender discrimination is diminishing, is 
illustrated by declining gender-inequality indexes (table 7). These indexes are based on 
indicators related to reproductive health (maternal mortality ratio and adolescent fertility rate), 
empowerment (female share of parliamentary seats and female attainment in secondary and 
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higher education) and labor participation ( percentage of women in the labor force).
5
 These 
indexes range between 0 and 1, whereby 0 indicates a situation in which complete gender 
equality exists, and 1 points to a situation in which females are as highly discriminated as 
possible in every domain of life. Judged on the basis of the gender-inequality indexes, women 
in Kuwait, Libya, the United Arab Emirates and Tunisia have made most progress during the 
previous years, while in Saudi Arabia and Sudan no progress has been made. Yemen is one of 
the countries with the highest gender inequality indexes in the world, although some progress 
has been made recently.  
Although the position of women has improved in several Arab countries, we are still 
far away from gender equality. The fact that women in the Arab World have the world’s 
lowest participation rates at the labor market and in politics, is telling enough (Fargues 2005). 
Urgent issues like violence towards women, female genital mutilation and polygamy are 
showing that many women in the region are still suffering. Especially in countries where 
Islamic Law is still dominant – like in Saudi Arabia – females have only limited rights inside 
and outside the family. As a consequence they keep being dominated by their husbands and 
have very limited freedom of movement outside the household. Notwithstanding some 
protests, women in Saudi Arabia still today are not allowed to drive a car. Legal change is 
needed. A good example is Morocco’s 2004 Moudawana (family law code) reform, which 
improved women’s status and liberty in many domains of life. However, legal change alone is 
not enough as social practice often considerably deviates from law, especially if it comes to 
issues within the privacy of the family. Education and political campaigns can help to open 
the road towards a new mentality in which the position of women is revalued.  
 
7 Accelerated ageing 
 
Although most reports on the Middle East and North Africa today are concerned with the fact 
that the Arab World has one of the youngest populations in the world, ageing has already 
started and will accelerate. Median ages are on the rise as the proportions of youth are 
dropping, while the percentage of (in-active) elderly people is increasing. A growing number 
of elderly people will have to rely on care from shrinking proportions of young people. As a 
consequence, burdens for the next generation and insecurity among the older generation is 
likely to augment.  
Like in Europe today, ageing will become a challenge for Arab societies in the future, 
but in a different way. First, the pace of the ageing process will evolve faster than was the 
case in Europe, as mortality and fertility decrease faster in most Arab countries than in 
historical Europe. This makes it necessary to develop an ageing policy, to avoid negative 
consequences related to health-care, old-age pensions, and labor market performance. As 
                                                 
5
 United Nations, Human Development Reports: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/gii/  
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ageing proceeds, pressure will arise on pension systems. These systems are likely to fail and 
even collapse if the current low retirement ages will not be raised (Kárpáti 2011). In the Arab 
World, ageing will cause other challenges than in the West, as in most countries in the region 
the primary safety-net is not a social security system, but family assistance (Olmsted 2005; 
Rashad, Osman & Roudi-Fahimi 2005). This means that the costs ageing generates will 
largely be carried by families and individuals. After all the coverage of the pension systems in 
the region is low, which means that few people in the region will be able to rely on retirement 
payment (Kárpáti 2011).  
Due to differences in the timing and pace of the fertility transition there are major 
regional differences in the ageing process (graphs 14 to 23). The ‘good’ news is that during 
the next decades the richest Arab countries will be most affected by ageing, while the poorest 
countries will be least affected. The Gulf States will be most affected, as fertility has declined 
profoundly, and life-expectancy has risen spectacularly. Since most of these states provide 
health-care for free, public expenditure related to medical care will rise massively. An 
important factor is migration. The oil-rich countries of the Gulf have attracted huge numbers 
of migrants, which are often not accompanied by partners and badly integrated. As they grow 
older, these people will likely get into trouble as they are unable to rely on family assistance. 
The Maghreb is the second region which will be most affected by ageing. The high pace of 
the demographic change in combination with the poor social security provided by the states, 
makes this region vulnerable to the ageing process. Social inequality is likely to augment. A 
rift may arise between those families which can rely on remittances from abroad and those 
families which do not have such additional resources. In the Mashreq, and especially in the 
peripheral Southern Arab countries, the (negative consequences of the) ageing process will 
start later, as fertility has only recently declined. This gives these countries extra time to 
implement adequate ageing policies.  
Some groups will be more affected by the consequences of ageing than others. 
Childless couples will face more difficulties. Women are more vulnerable than men because 
they live longer. The extra care needed for the elderly will largely be provided by younger 
females, which will decrease their chances to work outside of the household and consequently 
will decrease their potential to raise an extra income. While young females will have to spend 
less time and energy on child-rearing, they will increasingly have to look after elderly family 
members. Problems can partially be solved if the number of homes for elderly will be 
extended and if the cost of care in such homes will be provided by the state. However, such a 
policy will only be effective if the willingness of elderly people to move to old people’s home 
increases. Currently, a very negative attitude towards such institutions exists as elderly people 
feel disowned by their children, if they are sent to such an institution. 
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Graph 14: Age structure of the Arab population 2010 
 
 
Graph 15: Age structure of the Arab population 2050 (projections) 
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Graph 16: Age structure of the Gulf States 2010 
 
 
 
Graph 17: Age structure of the Gulf States 2050 (projections) 
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Graph 18: Age structure of the Maghreb 2010 
 
 
 
Graph 19: Age structure of the Maghreb 2050 (projections) 
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Graph 20: Age structure of the Mashreq, 2010 
 
 
Graph 21: Age structure of the Mashreq, 2050 (projections) 
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Graph 22: Age structure of the Periphery 2010 
 
 
Graph 23: Age structure of the Periphery 2050 (projections) 
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8. Realistic extremes: desperate adolescents, overstrained parents, family conflicts 
 
Since delayed marriage is in some cases not the result of free-choice, but of hardship, higher 
ages at marriage will create frustrations among youngsters and tensions within  families. 
Although youngsters in the Arab World have invested more in education than their parents, 
meeting the economic requirements for marriage has become more difficult. This can result in 
problems since marriage is linked to the transition to adulthood. As long as youngsters are not 
married, they are not fully perceived as adults, because they have no (religious and legal) 
allowance for sex and because they have not yet taken the responsibilities of setting up a 
household. Moreover, marriage is perceived as a religious obligation (Marks 2011b: 24). In 
this light, delayed marriage is a source of frustration. It may also lead to tensions within and 
between families as marriage in the Arab world is not only an individual decision, it also 
concerns families. The tricky point is that young people are expected to marry, want to marry, 
while marriage has become more difficult to attain.  
As few singles set up independent households, youngsters spend a prolonged time of 
their life in their family of orientation. This limits the youngster’s freedom, and extends the 
obligations of both parents and children. For unmarried females the limitations are most 
severe. Since women are until today expected to preserve virginity until marriage, female’s 
freedom of movement is limited. In the patriarchal Arab world, parents and brothers try 
everything to control the sexuality of their families’ unmarried females in order to preserve 
the honor of the family. Breaking the rules on female sexuality may lead to shame and may 
even result in honor killings (Zuhur 2003). In order to avoid that females lose their virginity 
before marriage, parents and brothers try to keep unmarried females as much as possible in 
the household. Contact with non-relative males is prohibited. Girls who are spotted with men, 
face the risk of social gossip, which brings shame to the family and might in turn decrease the 
females’ chances of getting married.   
In societies in which girls marry on average at age 30, the requirement of virginity is 
many times more demanding than in societies where the age at first marriage is 18. Limiting 
females comings and goings for another twelve years, is not evident. The fact that parents are 
often dependent on their daughter’s income makes things more complicated. Moreover, girls 
are often better educated than their parents. Under such conditions it has become less likely to 
force daughters to obey. Females try to keep relationships secret, which causes fear and stress. 
A less dramatic, but still urgent issue, is the financial burden which an extended period 
of life in the family of orientation brings about. As children live longer within their family of 
orientation, the time in which parents take care of their children is extended. This means that 
parents need to provide their children with food, clothes and housing during an extended 
period of time (Singerman 2007: 14). Simultaneously, the main financial transfer between 
parents and children is postponed, which is still another way in which the opportunities of 
youngsters are limited before marriage. At the same time, youngsters are expected to 
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contribute to the family budget, which limits their possibilities for private spending and 
saving money for later married life.  
 
9. Marriage, youth bulges and revolution 
 
Discussions on the background of the recent revolutions in the Arab world keep going on. 
Scholars point to a wide range of political (the pursuit of democracy, the end of corruption, 
etc.), economical (high unemployment rates, high food prices, etc.) and technological (role of 
the internet and social media) causes. Moreover, some analysts in the field are of the opinion 
that demographic factors play a decisive role in the outbreak of the Arab spring (Cincotta 
2012; Cincotta this volume;). These authors focus on the so-called youth bulge theory (Möller 
1968/69; Goldstone 1991; Urdal 2006; Heinsohn 2006; Cincotta 2012). According to this 
theory, the risk of revolutions and armed conflicts increases if there is an excess of young (15-
24 years) people, especially young men. 
There is no evidence that revolutions can be predicted solely on the basis of the 
existence of a specific type of population structure, i.e. a youth bulge. First of all, many 
revolutions have happened in the absence of such youth bulges. Second, young populations do 
not necessarily experience revolutionary events. During the nineteenth century, the 
Netherlands was characterized by a population structure which resembles today’s Egypt. 
However, no notable revolution took place. Third, the Arab countries in which revolutionary 
events took off are themselves characterized by a great diversity in population structures. 
Tunisia, for example, has a much older population than Yemen. Both countries experienced 
more or less at the same time revolution. Judged on information on proportions of people 
aged 15 to 24, one would have expected that the Arab Spring had occurred much earlier in 
countries like Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. Consequently, models based on the youth bulge 
theory are unable to explain the timing of revolutions (Engelen & Puschmann 2011b). 
A crucial missing factor in the existing debates, is the marriage change. Marriage has 
stayed one of the highest aims of young people in the Arab world and although youngsters 
have invested more time, energy and money in education than previous generations, access to 
marriage has become more difficult. This is one of the great disappointments of the Arab 
youth today. This has to do with the fact that their transition to adulthood is delayed and their 
sexuality is restrained during the prime of their life. This is reinforced by the fact that 
unmarried people are more eager to protest and use violence against the existing order than 
married people. Studies confirm that violence and social disorder is higher amongst (young) 
unmarried men (Courtwright 1998; Daly & Wilson 1990; Sampson, Laub & Wimer 2006). 
Marks (2011a) found evidence that unmarried males in Egypt are more willing to take part in 
high-risk political activity than married males. 
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10 The dual role of marriage in family dynamics and population growth 
 
In this chapter we have shown that the profound changes in the marriage regime will have 
both positive and negative effects on Arab society. That is why we are talking about a dual 
role of marriage, a kind of Janus face. On the one hand, rising ages at marriage help to shrink 
the demographic divide between the Arab Countries and the West. Tempered population 
growth will have major positive impacts for individuals, families and society. Reductions in 
unemployment, declining rural-to-urban migration, poverty reduction, less environmental 
damage and more effective urban planning are some of the expected effects. Moreover, 
families will be released from the burden of feeding a great number of children. For children 
it will mean that parents will be able to spend more attention to them. Parents will have more 
resources available for each individual child.  
Rising ages at marriage also have important positive effects on the position of women. 
Since marriage is postponed and the number of offspring reduced, women have more time 
available to engage in non-reproductive activities. This improves their bargaining power as 
paid labor gives them more power over the household’s resources and consequently a greater 
say in all kind of decisions. Furthermore, as the age at first marriage has increased faster 
among women than among men, the spousal age gap is reducing.  
However, marital change also brings about new challenges. Because of the advanced 
pace of fertility decline, ageing in the Arab world will accelerate. This will form a burden for 
the next generation. Since most states in the region provide only limited social security for 
their subjects, individual families will bear most of the extra costs ageing bring about. Ageing 
will affect especially women, because they have higher life-expectancy, less financial means, 
and less chances to rely on family assistance. Ageing could also create new limitations to 
women’s freedom of movement, since most of the care for elderly people will be provided by 
women.  
Marital change also brings about frustration, tensions and conflicts in families and 
society at large, because delayed marriage is not a free choice, but amongst others, a result of 
economic hardship. Furthermore, marital change implies a postponement in the transition to 
adulthood, which in turn, brings about limitations from and extra obligations toward parents. 
For females the limitations are severest, amongst other things because of the requirement of 
virginity before marriage. Young people are most frustrated because they have invested more 
in their future, but can reach major aims in life – like marriage  – less easily. All these 
frustrations are likely to have contributed to the willingness to protest and riot against existing 
regimes in the Arab world.  
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